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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set out in Appellants' brief does
not clearly set forth the issues in this case but appears
to add more confusion to a mining case which appeared
at first to be rather involved and complicated but which
actually has turned into a simple one. Admittedly the
various pleadings, amended pleadings, conflicting proof of
mining claims, a fairly large transcript of the testimony~
all presented to a jury, when the case could have been
tried much more expeditiously before the court without
a jury, lend credence to the impression that this is a
com plica ted case.
With the dismissal of the Respondents' Cross Appeal,
we are actually concerned only with conflicts in three
claims of the appellants with three claims of the respondents:
(1) The appellants' Red Robin "A" and respondents'
Red Hill No.1: Here the appellants' Red Robin "A" was
the prior location and since the location is not attacked, .our only concern is whether the appellants did the
required annual labor for the year ending July 1 in
which respondents subsequently located. The Jury has
found that the appellants did not do this work.
(2) The appellants' Red Robin mining claim and respondents' Cinder Crater No. 13: The respondents' Cinder Crater No. 13 was located first and since the location is not assailed, we are only concerned with wheththe respondents did the required annual labor for the
year ending July 1 in which the appellants located.
The Jury has found that the work was done.
(3) The appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8, which con-
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flict with the respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14: The
respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 was located first
and since the location is not attacked, except insofar
as it is claimed the ground was not open for location
at the time Cinder Crater No. 14 was located, we are
only concerned with whether the respondents did the
required annual labor for the year ending July 1 in
which appellants subsequently located. The Jury has
found that the work was done.

Therefore, in all three conflicts, the respondents
prevailed in the court below.
The only other pertine·nt facts have to do with the
conflict between appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8 with respondents' Cinter Crater No. 14 mentioned above, and
since the respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 was the prior
location, the appellants attempted to show that at the
time the respondents located this claim on July 28, 1947,
there was at that time a valid, subsisting location on
generally the same ground and, therefore, it was not open
to respondents' location. The appellants' pleadings, the
pre-trial order and the evidence show that other parties, not parties in this action, had approximately ten
years previous to respO'ndents' location on the Nlf2SE~
of Section 23, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, S. L.
B. & M. located Black Dragon No. 6. However, for the
year ending July 1, 1947, the owners of the old prior
claim, the Black Drago·n No. 6, had not done annual
labor or filed any Notice of Intent to Hold a-nd had not
done so for a number of years prior. Therefore, the Black
Dragon No. 6 had forfeited and the ground was then
open for respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 location.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The following points are relied upon by the
ents to meet the claims of the appellants:

respond~

1. THE JURY'S FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENTS HAD
DONE THE REQUIRED ANNUAL LABOR ON CIN~
DER CRATER NO. 13 AND 14 AND THAT THE AP~
PELLANTS HAD NOT DONE THE REQUffiED
AMOUNT OF ANNUAL LABOR FOR THEIR RED
ROBIN "A" WAS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND THE JURY'S FINDINGS WILL NOT
BE DISTURBED.
2. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE MAP OF APPELLANTS'
WITNESS A. R. SHELTON AS IT WAS ONLY A PIC~
TURE SUMMARY OF HIS TESTIMONY AND IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROPER FOR THE JURY
TO HAVE THIS MAP IN ADDITION TO THE TES~
TIMONY.
3. REFUSAL BY LOWER COURT OF APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO ALLOW JURY TO VISIT PREMISES
IS PURELY DISCRETIONARY AND IN THE AB~
SENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WILL NOT
BE DISTURBED.
4. REFUSAL BY THE LOWER COURT OF APPEL~
LANTS' MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS AND
THE PRE~TRIAL ORDER AFTER THE TRIAL HAD
COMMENCED WAS DISCRETIONARY AND
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL.
5. FEDERAL STATUTES OR RESOLUTIONS DISPENS~
lNG WITH REQUIREMENT OF ANNUAL LABOR
AND ALLOWING NOTICE OF INTENT TO HOLD
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IN LIEU THEREOF REQUIRE THE ACTUAL FILING OF THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO HOLD
OR THE CLAIM WILL FORFEIT.
6. A RE-LOCATION OF A MINING CLAIM BY A PARTY AFTER SUIT HAS BEEN COMMENCED BUT
BEFORE TRIAL, IS GOOD PROVIDING APPROPRIATE PLEADINGS ARE FILED.
7. APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO INJECT INTO
THE CONTROVERSY THE OWNERSHIP OF APPELANTS' DRAKE NO 3 CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT
AS THE LOWER COURT AWARDED THIS CLAIM
TO THE APPELLANTS AND THIS MATTER IS NOT
BEFORE THE COURT
ARGUMENT
Point 1
The Jury's findings that respondents had done therequired annual labor on Cinder Crater No. 13 and 14
and that the appellants had not done the required
amount of annual labor for their Red Robin "A" was
amply supported by the evidents and will not be disturbed.
In this case the appellants were granted a jury trial
over the objection of the respondents. The questions of
fact were submitted to the jury by Special Interrogatories. The appellants presented evidence of annual labor
performed on their Red Robin "A" claim and this evidence is found at pages 11, 214, 215, 218 and 349 of the
Transcript. This was disputed by the respondent and
Special Interrogatory No. 2 (Tr. 365) was submitted to
the jury to find if the required annual labor was actual-
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ly performed. The jury found unanimously that it had
not been performed. The appellants' contention appears
to be that the Court should have ruled as matter of law
that the annual labor had been performed but it is submitted this is indeed a novel contention in view of the
fact there was evidence submitted and it was a question
of fact upon which the jury should find.
Although the findings of the jury would give to appellants most of their Red Robin Claim, actually the only
conflict involving this claim was in a very small area in
the northwest corner of respondents' Cinder Crater No.13
claim. As the Cinder Crater No. 13 was located prior, the
jury heard ample evidence as to the respondents' annual
labor for this claim for the year ending July 1, 1949 consisting of removing of overburden and the construction
of a road to the claim (Tr. 222-227). Special interrogatory
No. 5 (Tr. 366) was submitted to the jury and it found
that the respO'ndents had performed the required annual
labor. The testimony of the respondents was detailed
and complete as to the dates, type of equipment used
and the amount and value of the work and it is .t:ubmitted that the findings of the jury should not be disturbed.
The remaining co·nflict was between the appellants'
Drake No. 1 and 8 claims which covered generally the
same ground as respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14. Here
again (Tr. 229-237) the respondents supplied detailed
evidence as to the work for the year in question, showing the amount and value of the work done in the removing of over-burden preparatory to mining and the
building of roads. The appellants disputed this and submitted evidence and photographs trying to prove the respondents had not done the work. Again this very question was submitted to the jury by Special Interrogatory
No. 6 (Tr. 366), and again the jury found that the work
was done.
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As to whether annual labor has been performed for
any given year by a locator is always a question of fact.
It is common knowledge that this testimony is almost
always in conflict and after wild claims are made by the
conflicting parties. a jury must weigh the testimony and
arrive at some finding. It is on such factual questions as
this that the wisdom of submitting the special issues by
special interrogatories is clearly evident. The court, by
clearing away the chaff, makes it possible for the jury
to make a clear cut decision and one which should not
be disturbed if there was evidence to support the finding
as was the case here.
Point 2
It was not error for the lower court to refuse to accept the map of the appellants' witness, engineer A. R.
Shelton, as it was only a summary of his testimony
and it would have been improper for the jury to have
had this map in addition to the testimony.

The appellants are raising strenuous objections to the
lower court's refusal to accept a map prepared by appellants' witness, engineer A. R. Shelton. Engineer Shelton
had surveyed all the claims in question preparatory to becoming a witness. He testified at great length (Tr. 22-66).
He testified as to what he had done and seen on these
conflicting claims. Most of the testimony was relevant
and competent. At the conclusions of his testimony, appellant offered a map made by Mr. Shelton which map
as stated in appellants' brief recited "upon which he drew
the results of his work and examination of the claims at
the time the survey was made and recorded the monuments observed in his thorough examination of plaintiffs' claims." The court refused to receive as evidence
this map until a further study of the map by counsel
could be made, with the court's suggestion (Tr. 33-34)
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that counsel discuss the admissability of the map. The
record is silent as to any further offer of the map, but
even so, it would have been clearly incompetent as it was
only a favorable resume or re-capitulation of Engineer
Shelton's testimony and which, under our rules of procedure, the jury could have taken to the jury room and
studied and used. But for a jury to hear the testimony
a·nd then be able to take with them a picture of the testimony so as to refresh their memories, would have been
highly improper. Rule 47 {m) of our Rules of Procedure
states what can be taken to the jury room and expressly
states that notes taken by a juror can be taken but
"none taken by any other person." It is submitted, the
map was only Shelton's notes. Furthermore, even assuming this type of evidence had not been incompetent,
the appellants surely have no room to complain because
the jury heard the testimony given by the witness, all
of which was the same as that on the map and a refusal
of the map as an exhibit would not have been prejudicial.

Point 3
Refusal by Lower Court of Appellants' motion to allow
jury to visit premises is purely discretionary and in
the absence of abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed.
The appellants requested that the jury be allowed to
make an inspection of the claims in question. The request
was denied on the ground that the evidence showed that
there were many diggings and workings and roads
throughout the entire area and the court was afraid the
jury would be more confused than ever after the inspection.
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A request for a jury inspection is always addressed to
the sound discretion of the court a:nd this rule is so elementary there need be no citations of authorities. But in
any event, if this court desires to inquire into the question of whether there was an abuse of discretion, it only
has to look at the testimony of one Culbert Robinson,
witness for appellants, (Tr. 309-328). Robinson was taken
to the premises during the course of the trial purely for
the purpose of qualifying him as a witness. But his testimony was the most confusing of any testimony at the
entire trial. There is no reason to believe that the jurors
themselves would have been any less confused.

Point 4
Refusal of lower court of appellants' motion to amend
pleadings and the pre-trial order after trial had commenced was discretionary and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Again we have a matter for the court's discretion. As
shown in the statement of facts there is a conflict between appellants' Drake No. 1 and 8 and respondents'
Cinder Crater No. 14. The respondents' location was on
July 28, 1947, several years prior to the Drake locations.
Therefore, the appellants, in order to defeat the respondents' location set up that an old claim, known as the
Black Dragon No.6, covered generally the same ground.
This old claim had been located approximately ten years
prior to respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 and the claim
is that this Black Dragon was a valid subsisting claim on
July 28, 1947 so as to defeat the respondents' location of
their Cinder Crater 14. It is admitted that the general
rule of law is that if there is a valid, subsisting claim
on mining ground when a subsequent locator attempts
to locate, the subsequent locator gets nothing by his location. Several pre-trials were held in this case and also

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
a number of hearings on preliminary matters. The appellants' complaint was also amended so as to set up this
old Black Dragon No. 6 claim. In all the hearings, the
pre-trials and pleadings, the appellants were relying
upon the old Black Dragon No. 6, located by people not
concerned with this controversy, to defeat the respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 location.
The evidence shows that when the locators of the
Black Dragon No. 6 located this claim on October 28,
1937, they also located on the same day Black Dragon
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. An amended location notice on the
Black Dragon No. 6 was recorded June 28, 1939 which
tied this claim to government survey corners and government subdivisions as the first location had not done.
Thereafter, the locators did annual labor or filed Notices
of Intent to hold all of the Black Dragon claims up to
and including July 1, 1942. This is all shown in an abstract of title to the Black Dragon claims, Defendants'
exhibit No. 58. This abstract shows that the locators of
the Black Dragon claims sold Black Dragon Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 to a purchaser in 1942. Thereafter Notices of
Intent to hold were filed by the new owner for all the
years thereafter including July 1, 1947, but only on the
claims purchased, or Black Dragon Nos. 1, 2. 3, 4 and 5.
But Black Dragon No. 6 was the claim in conflict with
respondents' Cinder Crater No. 14 and yet since no annual labor was performed or Notice of Intent to Hold in
lieu thereof was recorded, this claim forfeited.
Appare·ntly the appellants did not know until shortly
before trial that the Black Dragon No. 6 upon which they
had relied in order to defeat respondents' Cinder Crater
No. 14 had lapsed for failure to do annual labor or include it in the Notices of Intention to Hold. The record
shows (Tr. 144) that one day before the trial commenced,
that counsel for respondent was informed that the appel-
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lants claimed that Black Dragon No.5 and 6 were actually one and the same claims and claimed the same ground.
But respondents had prepared their entire case for trial
on the theory that Black Dragon No. 6 had lapsed and
would be of no concern. A claim that Black Dragon No.
5 and 6 were one and the same claim completely changed
the entire case because Black Dragon No. 5 was still
good at the time respondents located their Cinder Crater
No. 14. It would have been highly prejudicial to have to
meet the validity of Black Dragon No.5 after reliance on
appellants' pleadings, the preliminary hearings and the
pre-trial order, particularly in view of the fact that the
appella·nts had had more than ample opportunity to
amend so as to make Black Dragon No. 5 an issue. Objection was made to amending the complaint and the
pre-trial order so as to bring Black Dragon No. 5 in issue, (Tr. 144). The jury was then excused and the court
examined quite fully, the appellant relying upon the
Black Dragon claims (Tr. 136-140). The court thereupon
ruled that it would be inequitable and prejudicial for
respondents to have to meet the validity of Black Dragon
No.5 and denied the motion to amend the complaint and
pre-trial order.
It is the ge·neral rule of law followed by this court in
many cases that such an amendment would be prejudicial to the adverse party and should not be allowed. See
Utah cases, Johnson vs. Continental Casualty Co., 300
P. 1032, Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 57 Pac. 2d 1132, Benson
vs. Oregon Short Line, 99 Pac. 1072, Newton vs. Tracy
Loan & Trust Co. 40 Pac. 2d 204. Also that since it is
within the sound discretion of the court, it is not an
abuse of discretion whe·n refused at or just before the
trial.

Point 5
Federal statutes or resolutions dispensing with re-
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quirement of annual labor and allowing notice of intent to hold in lieu thereof require the actual filing
of the notice of intention to hold or the claim will
forfeit.
The appellants' contentions at Point VI of their brief
that it is not necessary for an owner of a mining claim
to actually comply with the law in order to hold the
claim is entirely without merit. It is submitted that when
the federal laws or resolutions of Congress provide in unambiguous terms what must be done, they mean exactly
what they say.
The Federal government at numerous times has relieved a locator of a mining claim from doing annual
labor. Congress did this back in the 1893 "Depression"
and again in 1917 and 1918 during World War I. Also during the "Depression" of the nineteen thirties and again
during World War II from 1943 to 1949. In each instance
because of some national emergency, annual labor was
dispensed with. But i'n each instance Congress has required that in lieu of annual labor, the locator shall file
in the County where the claim is located, a Notice of Intention to Hold. The reason for this is obvious as the locator must show good faith in his intentions to hold and
he must do somethi'ng to give notice to the world that he
has not abandoned his claim. The provision suspending
annual labor which applies to this case was a resolution
adopted by Congress May 3, 1943 and designated as H.R.
2370. It provided that the requirements of $100.00 worth
of labor per claim "is hereby suspended as to all mining
claims in the United States, including the Territory of
Alaska until the hour of 12 o'clock Meridian on the 1st
day of July after the cessation of hostilities in the present war as determined by proclamation of the President
or concurrent resolution of the Congress; Provided, that
every per·son claiming any such mining claim, in order to
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obtain the benefits of this act, ·shall file, or cause to be
filed, in the office where the location notice or certificate
is recorded, on or before 12 o'clock meridian of July 1 for
each year this act remains in effect, a notice of his desire to hold said mining claim under this act." This provision was tn effect until 1949.
In all cases found by this writer, where this question
has been ruled upon by the courts, it has been held, with
one exception, that the recording of a Notice of Intent to
Hold in lieu of annual labor is mandatory in order to
hold the claim. Some of these cases are Kramer vs. Gladding, McBean & Co. 85 Pac. 2d 552 (Cal.), Pine grove
Nevada Gold Mining Co. vs. Freeman, 171 Pac. 2d 366,
(Nevada). There do not appear to be too many cases involving these suspension statutes or resolutions and it
is submitted that the reason for this is because the requirements are so obvious that there has been on reason to appeal. It most certainly would be wrong for a
mining claimant to hold a claim indefinitely, without
doing any work or even complying with the suspension
requirements. He could hold a claim by having a secret
intention, not communicated to any one, to eventually
go back and assert ownership of the cltaim.
The only case found by this writer and which is cited
in appellants' brief which appears to hold the recording of a Notice of Intent to Hold is not necessary is the
case of Donoghue vs. Tonopah Oriental Mining Co. 198
Pac. 553 (Nevada). This is a very interesting case but
even a casual reading will clearly show it gives no help
to the appellants. There the several owners of a group
of claims, partly in Nye County and partly in Esmeralda
County, Nevada attempted to file a Notice of Intent to
Hold under the resolution of Congress for the year 1918
which for all practical purposes is the same as that
adopted during World War II. But the owners of the
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claim were in doubt as to whether their claim was in
Nye County or Esmeralda County as the County line was
still in some doubt although surveyed a few years previously. The owners tried in every way to comply with the
law and tried to record their notice in Nye County, but
the County Recorder, a person upon whom they relied,
told them it should be recorded in Esmeralda County
where it was eventually recorded. There was no question
about their intent and good faith but they recorded the
notice in the wro·ng county acting in good faith and in
bona fide compliance with the law. The Nevada Supreme
Court stated that it was not a question of construction
of the resolution as its meaning was clear but that it
should not be applied under the peculiar circumstances
of the case. With the wisdom of this decision, the Respondents agree but it clearly is not controlling in this
case. In this Nevada case the locators made an honest
attempt to comply but in the case at bar, the owner did
exactly nothing over a period of approximately five
years. If the 1943 resolution of Congress has no application to the present case, then it has no application at
all. Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court, in the Pine
Grove Case, supra, very carefully explained and distinguished the old Donoghue case.
Point No.6
A re-location of a mining claim by a party after suit has
been commenced but before trial, is good providing
appropriate pleadings are filed.
The appellants raise a hue and cry that the respondents located their Red Hill No. 1 claim in conflict with
the prior location of appellants' Red Robin "A" claim.
But here the record shows that the respondents had located years prior to either claim, their Cinder Crater No.
5 on the same ground. Before trial the respondents con-
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eluded their Cinder Crater No. 5 was not good but they
also concluded that appellants' Red Robin "A" was not
good for the reason that the annual labor had not been
performed. Consequently respondents re-located this
claim on September 6, 1956 under the name of Red Hill
No. 1. The jury found that the appellants had not performed their annual labor for the year ending July 1,
1956 and therefore, the respondents' subsequent location
was good.
With all the claims of the parties involved in this case,
to be tried before a jury, it would have been folly for the
court or jury to have spent considerable time in hearing
the evidence and then found that neither of the parties
had a valid claim upon this ground. So long as the matter is being litigated, it was only just and sensible that
the court and jury have proper claims before them to
make a decision.
Furthermore, the respondents' pleadings were amended several months before the trial so as to put the validity of the last location of Red Hill No. 1 in issue and no
objection to this amendment was made. The appellants
were fully apprised of the claim. Our code contemplates
the incorporating of facts happening after suit is commenced as issues in the case providing proper pleadings
are filed to bring the matter before the Court. See rule
15(d) of our Rules of Civil Procedure.
Point No.7
Appellants' contention that it was error for the court
to inject into the controversy the ownership of appellants' Drake No. 3 claim is without merit as the lower
court and jury awarded this claim to the appellants
and this matter is ·not before the Court.
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The appellants are attempting to raise as an issue the
fact that the lower court allowed the conflict between
appellants' Drake No. 3 and respondents' Black Lava No.
1 claim, which cover the same ground, to enter the case.
But surely the appellants have no cause to complain as
this conflict was resolved by the court and jury in favor
of the appellants and with the dismissal of respondents'
Cross Appeal, there is nothing before the Court as to
this claim. It is a situation of the appellant complaining
about a decision entirely in their favor and nothing more
need be said.
CONCLUSION
To summarize the contentions of the respondents, they
earnestly believe that the points raised by the appellants
have been met and refuted in each instance. The jury's
answering of the special interrogatories submitted to
them was amply supported by the evidence although admittedly much of it was in conflict. These findings were
not the result of a general verdict or decision of the jury
but were express findings upon interrogatories propounded to the jury on the specific qpestions of fact and the
court has accepted and adopted these findings. Since
there was evidence to support them, all of the appellants'
contentions pertaining to whether required annual labor
on the claims was or was not performed by the parties
has been resolved and should not be disturbed.
The contention of the appellant that the lower court
committed an error in refusing to allow an amendment
to the plaintiffs' complaint and the pre-trial order, after
the trial had progressed several days is without merit.
Such an amendment would have changed the whole complexion of the case and would have been highly inequitable and prejudicial to the respondents. Also this is a matter for the sound discretion of the court and surely there
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was no abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
Likewise the refusal of the court to permit a jury inspection of the claims was discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse of discretion.
The appellants' contention that even though Federal
Statutes or resolutions of Congress suspending the requirement of annual labor upon the filing of a Notice of
Inte·ntion to Hold actually do not require this to be done
flies directly in the face of the very Act of which appellants seek to take advantage. When the Federal Act relieved a locator of performing the annual labor by doing
something as easy as merely filing a short notice, surely
such a minimum requirement should be strictly complied with.
The appellants' other contentions that one of respondents' claims was located after the commencement of the
action has no merit as appropriate pleadings were filed,
making this an issue in the case. And finally, for the
appellants to complain about a matter resolved entirely
in their favor is indeed a novel idea.
Respectfully submitted,
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for Respondents
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